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Abstract
In a sample of newly created French rms, the impact of an entrepreneurs education
on the rms survival varies widely depending on his previous labor market situation.
While it is strongly positive for the overall population, it is much weaker or insignicant
for entrepreneurs who were previously unemployed or poorly matched. Our theoretical
entrepreneurship model shows that these di¤erences may be attributed to di¤erences
in unobserved human capital for better educated entrepreneurs across di¤erent initial
states in the labor market. Empirical results are consistent with the theory if employers
have limited information about potential entrepreneurshuman capital.
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1 Introduction
When considering the role of human capital in entrepreneurship, two potentially distinct
questions arise. The rst is whether di¤erent levels of human capital translate into di¤erent
propensities to become self employed, while the second concerns the impact of human capital
on entrepreneurial success. On the latter issue, it is usually found that a higher human
capital of the entrepreneur results in better performances for new rms (e.g. Bates, 1990,
2005, Parker and van Praag, 2006). By contrast, the role of human capital as a determinant
of self-employment is typically measured as insignicant (see Evans and Leighton, 1989,
Evans and Jovanovic, 1989, Georgellis et al., 2005 and references therein).
These empirical ndings suggest two research questions. First, the link between human
capital and self-employment, which undoubtedly exists, is non trivial and some theoretical
developments are needed in order to understand this better. Second, the standard measures
of human capital are only poor approximations of an individuals actual human capital.
This may lead to errors when evaluating the impact of human capital on entrepreneurial
performance, particularly when the e¤ect of human capital on self-employment decisions is
not properly accounted for. The present paper contributes in both these dimensions. First,
we provide a theory of self employment as a strategy aimed at optimizing an individuals
human capital valuation. Second, we use our theory to explain some systematic biases in
the measure of the impact of human capital on rm survival. Our key insight is that this
impact should be interpreted in view of the entrepreneurs initial state in the labor market.
If human capital a¤ects entrepreneurial choices, then observing entrepreneurship by an
individual should lead us to update our evaluation of his actual human capital as compared
to what may be inferred from variables in the data such as education or work experience.
To appreciate the role of human capital in entrepreneurship, note that the decision to
start a business is, in most cases, associated with a decision to become self-employed. For
1
instance, in 2007, 86:7% of newly created rms in France started their activity without any
employee. The choice of self-employment means that the entrepreneur anticipates better
returns on his human capital by running his own rm than what he could obtain by selling
it in the labor market. The reasons for such a higher expected return may however be quite
di¤erent across individuals. Entrepreneurship may either reect some favorable attributes
of the entrepreneur that are best exploited by starting a business, or a very unfavorable
labor market situation which the entrepreneur is trying to escape. The extent to which
entrepreneurship is a favorable signal for the entrepreneurs human capital crucially hinges
on the likelihood of the rst motive relative to the second.
Economic intuition suggests that individuals with better education or work experience
have a stronger incentive to move to a more favorable labor market position: rewards on
labor market participation or from a better match are higher for better skilled workers and
a long spell of unemployment or inappropriate matching might cause a depreciation of their
human capital. Hence, entrepreneurs who started out in a poor labor market situation and
whose measure of human capital in the data is good, are less likely to have gone into self-
employment to exploit some unobserved ability. We should therefore expect that among
entrepreneurs with a bad initial situation, di¤erences in human capital as observed in the
data overstate di¤erences in actual human capital.
The above intuition is born out by our empirical results. We use a survey of French
rms that were created in 1994 for which we have survival data up to the end of 1997.
We also have information about the prior employment status of the entrepreneur as well as
whether he has previously worked within the branch of activity of the new business. We
perform duration analysis on the rms survival. Regarding the impact of education, the
above reasoning suggests a potential sample selection bias which cannot be corrected since
the sample is comprised solely of entrepreneurs.1 Further, we expect this bias to be related
1See Montgomery et al. (2005) for an instance of a joint estimation of the impact of human capital on
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to the individuals initial situation in the labor market. Therefore we consider four initial
states: unemployed for less than a year, unemployed for more than a year, employed without
experience in the new rms branch and employed with experience in the new rms branch.
In our econometric investigations, higher education of the entrepreneur enhances survival
very signicantly for the nal group, whereas it has at best a limited impact on survival for
the other three. Now, entrepreneurs in these three groups are more likely to be endowed with
a bad initial state than those in the nal group. This is obviously true for individuals who
were unemployed. Further, those who had a job but chose to switch to a di¤erent branch
of activity when they started a business are likely to have been poorly matched in their
previous occupation. Thus, the weak impact of education on the new rms survival may
be attributed to the unobserved abilities which are expected to be low for highly educated
entrepreneurs in these three groups.
We also show that the basic intuition is consistent with the theoretical results derived
in a model of entrepreneurial choice focusing on labor market incentives. We introduce ad
hoc labor market rigidities that prevent a worker from attaining his preferred job. This
allows for entrepreneurs starting a business in order to evade an unfavorable state in the
labor market. Evans and Leighton (1989) nd that entrepreneurship may be a response to
labor market rigidities, where the probability of going into self-employment is much larger
for unemployed workers, lower-paid wage workers or men that have changed jobs a lot
(p.521).2
We consider that any human capital that is utilized in setting up a new rm would be
valuable to a potential employer.3 If this human capital were perfectly observable and labor
contracts fully e¢ cient, the individual would prefer to sell all of the information he has on
entrepreneurial choice and performance.
2Similarly, the share of the unemployed among French entrepreneurs in 1994 was about three times the
unemployment rate for the entire labor force.
3Here, human capital should be viewed in a very broad sense as including any knowledge that the
entrepreneur may have that will contribute to making his business successful.
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the protability of the new project to an employer and invest his wealth in the nancial
markets, rather than start his own business.4 We therefore assume that employers are
imperfectly informed about the employees actual human capital5 or that the employment
relation involves some agency problem. Actual human capital may therefore be undervalued,
particularly in the case of potential entrepreneurs who may have some unusual and novel
management, commercial or technological skills.
Potential employers base their employment and wage o¤er decisions on their beliefs
about human capital, derived from the information in the vitae as well as some additional
insights obtained from job interviews and pre-employment tests. Although this information
is not perfect, it is presumably more accurate than that available in a survey of entrepre-
neurs such as the one exploited in this paper. Our modeling approach allows for such a
di¤erence in information, where the employersinformation may be anywhere between per-
fect and as bad as that of the survey. Even if information is perfect, human capital may
still be rewarded di¤erently in the labor market and in self-employment. In particular, self
employment eliminates ine¢ ciencies due to the separation between ownership and control
that lead to ine¢ cient e¤ort levels. In any case, entrepreneurship is then a means of over-
coming undervaluation of human capital in the labor market.6 We show that our empirical
ndings are more consistent with a model where the employers information is as limited as
that in the data, than with a model where the employers information about human capital
is perfect. Our model also suggests that duration analysis of rm survival should allow for
unobserved heterogeneity, the unobserved human capital that is not explained by education
or the initial state, which informs our empirical application.
4Financial markets should be better suited for investing nancial wealth as suggested by the study of
Moskowitz and Vissing-Jorgensen (2002) who nd that rewards on capital invested in entrepreneurship are
not above what could be achieved on the nancial markets, whereas risk premia should induce a reverse
result.
5Stern (1990) has explored the implications of such imperfect information on unemployment duration.
6Of course there is room for alternative psychological explanations such as McClellands need of achieve-
ment (1961), Shaperos locus of control (1975) or Pinfolds overcondence (2001).
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Existing theoretical literature typically assumes that entrepreneurship requires some spe-
cic human capital, the managerial ability, which cannot be sold in the labor market (see
Lucas, 1978, Jovanovic, 1982, Evans and Jovanovic, 1989, Fonseca et al., 2001, Cagetti and
De Nardi, 2006); only those who have the highest managerial abilities choose to become en-
trepreneurs.7 Our theory suggests that these managerial abilitiesmay be traded on some
labor market just like any other form of human capital but such a market may not exist due
to information asymmetries.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some descriptive statistics on
the impact of human capital on rms survival for subpopulations of entrepreneurs corre-
sponding to di¤erent initial states in the labor market. Our model of entrepreneurial choice
(Section 3) emphasizes the role of unobserved human capital and shows that the choice of
self-employment provides information about actual human capital. Section 4 reports and
discusses the ndings from our empirical study, and Section 5 draws conclusions.
2 Some descriptive statistics
We rst present and discuss some simple statistics regarding the impact of an entrepreneurs
education on rm survival and how this impact relates to the entrepreneurs previous state
in the labor market. The data are extracted from the SINE8 94 survey, which was con-
ducted by the French National Institute of Statistical and Economic Studies9 in 1994. It
provides qualitative data on entrepreneurship and, more specically, variables pertaining to
the entrepreneur and the circumstances in which entrepreneurship occurred. A second sur-
vey carried out in 1997 (SINE 97) provides information on survival status of the same rms
7Even when managerial abilities are not explicitly introduced, as in Kihlstrom and La¤ont (1979), it is
assumed that self-employment involves some specic risky rewards that may not be captured while holding
a wage position. Then it is the heterogeneity in risk aversion that determines which individuals become
entrepreneurs.
8Système dinformations sur les nouvelles entreprises(Information system on new rms)
9Insee (Institut National des Statistiques et des Etudes Economiques).
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closed down or still operating, and, when closed down, the date of the discontinuation.
The surveyed units belong to the private productive sector in the eld of manufacturing,
construction, commerce and services.
Since we wish to highlight the labor market motivations for entrepreneurship, we only
consider new rms set up by an individual and exclude takeovers from our analysis.10 In
order to ensure some homogeneity in labor supply behavior, we also narrow down the sample
further to French male middle aged (aged 30-50) entrepreneurs who started a business in
metropolitan France.
The SINE 94 database provides information on whether the entrepreneur was employed
prior to setting up the rm. For unemployed individuals it indicates whether the unemploy-
ment spell was short (less than one year) or long (beyond one year). For the employed, the
data provides information about the entrepreneurs experience in the branch of activity of
the new business. An individual who has had no such experience has necessarily changed
his branch of activity when he became self-employed, which suggests that he is likely to
have been poorly matched in his previous occupation. We therefore refer to this subgroup
as mismatched individuals. The above information allows us to classify initial state into
four di¤erent subgroups: employed in the same branch, employed in a di¤erent branch, un-
employed for less than one year, unemployed for more than one year. For each of these
subgroups we compare the survival rates of newly created rms for two extreme populations
of entrepreneurs: those holding a degree obtained after two years of higher education (whom
we label as having a high level of education) and those who hold no degree at all (labeled
as having low education). Combining these two groups we obtain a sample size of 5; 891
entrepreneurs.
10Previous research suggests that entrepreneurial choice for takeovers may be somewhat specic. Bates
(1990) points to some important reasons why a rm which is taken over is more prone to remain in business
than a new one. Specically, the new owner may benet from established managerial practises that are
embodied in the rm(p. 555).
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Table 1 reports survival rates according to the education level for each of the four sub-
groups corresponding to the four previous states of the entrepreneur.11 We nd that survival
rates for previously mismatched or unemployed entrepreneurs are lower than those of in-
dividuals who were previously employed in their preferred branch of activity (respectively,
48:33% and 54:87% against 67:63%). These ndings indicate that, more than the di¤erence
between employed and unemployed states, having been employed in the new rms branch
of activity provides a signicant advantage in terms of survival of the newly created rm.
Next we observe that the spread in survival rates between entrepreneurs with high and
low education level for the entire sample is 12:98 percentage points in favor of the former. For
previously employed entrepreneurs with experience acquired in the same branch of activity,
the gap is higher at 14:39%. By contrast we nd a much smaller spread for those entre-
preneurs who, when they chose self-employment, were either unemployed or mismatched.
For those who were previously unemployed, the gap is only 8:93 percentage points while for
those who were unemployed for less than a year it is even lower at 5:05%. For individuals
previously employed in a di¤erent branch of activity the observed gap in survival rates is
further down to 4:26%. Note that, while the largest observed spread (15:93%) is for previ-
ously long term unemployed individuals, this is not robust to conditioning on other observed
and unobserved factors.12
In line with previous research, we nd that a higher education level for the entrepreneur
enhances the survival rate of the rm. The interesting new insight is that the extent of this
positive impact strongly depends on the previous labor market state of the entrepreneur.
We argue in the remainder of the paper that these di¤erences may be explained by viewing
11The survival rates are weighted to take account of the over-representation of some subgroups (charac-
terized by geographic or sectoral di¤erences) in the original SINE sampling method.
12Econometric results of Section 4 indicate that the impact of education on survival is always strongest
for previously employed entrepreneurs with some experience in the rms sector. We nd however that the
impact for long term unemployed is more pronounced than for short term unemployed which, as we explain
in Section 4.4.1, is consistent with the theoretical model of Section 3.
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entrepreneurship as a response to labor market ine¢ ciencies. More specically, we argue
that the varying impact of education on survival across the four subgroups reects some
unobserved heterogeneity in human capital that is correlated with the entrepreneurs initial
state in the labor market. These di¤erent states correspond to di¤erent degrees of underval-
uation of the individuals human capital in the labor market. Therefore, entrepreneurship
reects di¤erent information about the individuals unobserved human capital.
Using the SINE 94 database, we can control for some alternative factors explaining vari-
ation in survival rates. One possible explanation is that, for the subpopulations where the
spread is small, those with low observed human capital start businesses in sectors where
survival rates are high whereas those with a high level of observed human capital select
sectors having high exit rates. Although it is true that the choice of a sector for the new
rms depends very much on the observed level of human capital13 this sectoral di¤erence
does not seem to depend much on the previous status (employed/unemployed) or on whether
the previous sector was di¤erent. Another possible explanation could be that in order to
ght unemployment, the government primarily subsidizes individuals with a low level of hu-
man capital and who face di¢ culties in entering salaried employment. This does not appear
to hold in the French context  both highly educated and uneducated entrepreneurs are
equally likely to receive government subsidies which in general enhance survival of the rms
(Abdesselam et al., 2004).
Before reporting a more systematic econometric analysis, we present below a simple
theoretical model of entrepreneurship. This model will help us better interpret the link
between entrepreneurship and unobserved human capital, and provide explanations for our
empirical ndings.
13Low observed human capital is associated with businesses in commerce, transportation or construction
while high level of observed human capital is typically associated with services.
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3 A simple model of Entrepreneurial choice with labor
market imperfections
We now present a stylized model of entrepreneurship, which highlights the following two
motives for choosing self employment:
(i) circumventing an undervaluation of human capital in the labor market;
(ii) avoiding human capital depreciation resulting from labor market frictions.
3.1 Entrepreneurial choice and labor market ine¢ ciencies
Consider an individual whose actual human capital, denoted K, is either high or low,
K 2 fH;Lg, H > L. This human capital may however not be perfectly observed by
employers. Rather, they assign a probability  to the event that human capital is high. This
imperfect information is consistent with a situation where the potential entrepreneur is un-
employed or has been holding a job for a limited time. Presumably, for individuals holding a
position with a long enough tenure this information asymmetry would be greatly reduced.14
At any rate, the employers information may be quite di¤erent from what might be observed
by an econometrician (typically, education level and work experience). To account for this
di¤erence in information we denote by  the (predicted) probability that the agent has high
human capital, based on available data on the individual. In other words, the econometri-
cians prior on human capital is given by  which we refer to as the entrepreneurs observed
human capital. Employers combine this data with additional information available to them
to obtain their own prior K() if actual human capital is K, K 2 fL;Hg. Here, K() is
a random variable that depends not only on observed human capital but is also correlated
with actual human capital.
We focus on the two extreme cases where either employers are perfectly informed, in
14The reduction in the asymmetry of information does not prevent undervaluation of human capital if
skills are rm-specic (Lazear, 2003) or if the small size of the rm does not allow promotion of individuals
to a level where their wage would correctly reects actual human capital.
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which case L() = 0 and H() = 1 with certainty for all , or where the employers have no
more information than we do, despite the interviews or the tests that the individual might
have taken, in which case L() = H() =  with certainty for all .
When deciding on whether or not to go into self employment, the individual may be in
one of two states. Either he is in an unfavorable state (state 0) that could be unemployment
or a salaried position with a bad match, or he is in a favorable state (state 1) that is a salaried
position with which he is well matched. Though the latter position is clearly preferable to
the former, the agent may be unable to reach it because of frictions on the labor market.
At the time of the entrepreneurial choice the individual compares the potential expected
benets from entrepreneurship to the expected future benets if he remains in his current
state in the labor market. These benets take into account the possibility that the individual
may not remain in the current state indenitely. The entrepreneurial choice is the outcome
of a dynamic program where the agent anticipates correctly, but with uncertainty, all future
consequences of his current choice and in particular, the evolution of his career. Here we
specify ad hoc value functions associated with each potential choice which depend to a large
extent on expected income in the current state or expected income in the newly created
business. It seems reasonable that the value functions should be monotonically increasing
in these earning levels. Let Yi() be the expected benets from staying in state i, i 2 f0; 1g.
If the individual is employed, he is paid a wage equal to his expected marginal productivity,
given the employers beliefs on his actual human capital. Similarly the individuals expected
earnings when unemployed are also increasing in  since unemployment benets may depend
on past wages and the agent may end up nding a new job where he will be paid according
to the employersevaluation of his human capital. Thus the expected value of staying in
state i is clearly increasing in the employers beliefs, , and it is higher in state 1.
We further assume that in state 0, the agents human capital depreciates. This depre-
ciation of actual human capital a¤ects future employersbeliefs, and it is for the most part
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through these beliefs that it a¤ects future earnings. Independently of the actual human cap-
ital we therefore assume that depreciation is all the more a concern that current employers
beliefs are more favorable.15 The negative impact of depreciation should be interpreted as
measuring the di¤erence between the earnings that the agent will obtain in the future if he
does not start a business today, and the earnings he will obtain returning to salaried employ-
ment after having been self-employed (having thus avoided depreciation). Self-employment
is a means of circumventing depreciation because the new rm will be started in the sector
where the individual is most productive. This potential return to a wage position by entre-
preneurs is empirically very relevant. Evans and Leighton (1989) nd that half of a cohort
of entrepreneurs have returned to wage employment after seven years.
To model depreciation formally, let us dene Z() as the discounted future earnings in
the labor market after a period of entrepreneurship andWi() = Yi() Z() as the earnings
of the individual if he stays in the labor market today, net of the future earnings he would
earn when going back to the labor market after having been an entrepreneur.
Given the above discussion we have W1() > W0() and W 01() > W
0
0(). The di¤erence
in slope is the result of the di¤erence in the direct impact of employersbeliefs on earnings
since the worker is most productive in state 1, but it also reects the impact of depreciation
for those who are in state 0; the higher the depreciation, the larger the di¤erence in slope
will be. If depreciation is strong enoughW 00 could even be negative. Finally, the di¤erence in
expected earnings between state 1 and state 0 should remain limited for those whose human
capital is identied by employers as being low ( close to zero). In such a case, the expected
productivity of labor is independent of the match and there is not much to lose in being
unemployed since the returns to work are low. We therefore assume that W0(0) = W1(0).
The value associated with creating a new business for an individual with actual human
15This assumption seems reasonable as long as an individual who chooses not to start a business today
does not anticipate that he will become an entrepreneur with a high probability in the future.
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capitalK is v(K)+, where  is a random variable which the agent observes perfectly.16 This
random term reects any factor that may a¤ect entrepreneurial choice, other than human
capital. In particular, it may reect some taste parameters like the taste for independence
or risk aversion. The distribution of  may also depend on access to nancing. For instance,
if access to nancing becomes more di¢ cult, the distribution of  shifts to the left. We
denote the cumulative distribution function and density of  by F and f respectively. We
assume that the distribution of  satises the increasing hazard rate property which holds
for most common distribution functions. The value of becoming an entrepreneur depends
solely on actual human capital, since earnings when self-employed are directly a¤ected by
human capital rather than indirectly through the beliefs of the employer.
Therefore, an agent in state i with actual human capital K will start a new business if
v(K) +  > Wi(K())
which happens with probability
Pi(;K) = 1  F [Wi(K())  v(K)]:
In the case of strong information asymmetries, K() =  for all K and for all  and in the
case of perfect information H() = 1 and L() = 0 for all :
Next we use the above model to infer on the individuals actual human capital from his
entrepreneurial choice, conditional on his initial state being favorable or otherwise. As may
be expected, predictions of the model will vary with information asymmetries in the labor
market.
3.2 Inferring actual human capital for new entrepreneurs
We characterize the posterior distribution of actual human capital as a function of the initial
state and observed human capital, conditional on the choice of self-employment. Since our
16v(K) is closely related to the wage that the individual could obtain in a situation where his actual human
capital is perfectly observed and correctly rewarded.
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prior beliefs on actual human capital is , using BayesLaw, the probability of a high human
capital given that an individual in state i has started a new rm is
e;i() =
Pi(;H)
Pi(;H) + (1  )Pi(; L)
Thus e;i(0) = 0, and e;i(1) = 1.
Entrepreneurship is a positive signal about actual human capital if and only if e;i() > .
This requires that Pi(;H) > Pi(; L) which holds if and only if
Wi(H()) Wi(L()) < v(H)  v(L) (1)
This means that the benets from having a high human capital are larger for a self-employed
individual than what they would be on the labor market. This seems reasonable for skills
that are especially relevant for success of the new business, and these are the kind of skills
that our empirical analysis will attempt to identify. When employers do not benet from any
additional information about human capital other than what is in the data, then (H() =
L() = ); so that the left hand side of (1) is 0 and entrepreneurship is always a positive
signal on actual human capital.
Now we investigate how far the advantages of high human capital varies with the initial
state of the entrepreneur. For this we consider the posterior distribution of human cap-
ital conditional on observed human capital , and this critically depends on information
asymmetries in the labor market. First suppose that human capital is perfectly observed by
employers, so that L() = 0 and H() = 1 for all . Then, we have
Pi(; L) = 1  F [Wi(0)  v(L)]
which depends neither on  nor on i (recall that Wi(0) does not depend on i) and
Pi(;H) = 1  F [Wi(1)  v(H)]
which does not depend on  and satises P1(;H) < P0(;H), since W1(1) > W0(1). Then
we have the following proposition:
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Proposition 1 Suppose that employers have perfect information about human capital. Then
the posterior conditional on the unfavorable state puts more weight on a high human capital
than the posterior conditional on the favorable state:
e;0() > e;1():
If employers observe human capital perfectly, an entrepreneur who was well matched in
his job when he started a business, state 1, should be expected to have a lower human capital
than an entrepreneur who was unemployed or stuck in a job where his productivity was low,
state 0. This is because, an individual with a high human capital has a stronger incentive to
become self-employed if his state is bad so that rewards on his human capital in the labor
market are low, whereas the incentives of a low human capital individual to start a business
are independent of his initial state since the labor market rewards his human capital equally
poorly in all states.
Now consider the other extreme state where employers have no more information than
what is in the data so that L() = H() = . Then
Pi(;K) = 1  F [(Wi()  v(K)]:
for both high and low human capital individuals. Note that the initial state only a¤ects the
posterior probability of a high capital through the values Wi(). The derivative of e;i with
respect to Wi has the sign of
f(Wi()  v(L))
1  F (Wi()  v(L))  
f(Wi()  v(H))
1  F (Wi()  v(H))
which is positive because of our monotone hazard rate assumption. Finally, since W1() >
W0(), e;1() > e;0() for all  2 [0; 1]. Then, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 2 Suppose that employers have no more information on actual human capital
than the econometrician. Then the posterior conditional on the favorable state puts more
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weight on a high human capital than the posterior conditional on the unfavorable state:
e;1() > e;0():
For a given level of observed human capital, , the incentives to start a business are lower
for individuals in the favorable state than for those in an unfavorable state, irrespective of
whether actual human capital is high or low. This is because earnings in the labor market,
being based solely on observed human capital, are independent of actual human capital.
Entrepreneurship is then more likely to reect a high level of actual human capital if the
initial state is favorable.
Comparing the results in propositions 1 and 2 shows that the impact of the initial state
of the entrepreneur on the posterior distribution of human capital is reversed in the case of
extreme information asymmetry from what it is under perfect information.
Let us now consider how the distribution of actual human capital, conditional on choice
of entrepreneurship, varies with observed human capital (). For this purpose, we consider
the derivative of the posterior probability e;i with respect to the prior .
If employers have complete information the above is given by
0e;i() =
Pi(;H)Pi(; L)
[Pi(;H) + (1  )Pi(; L)]2 =
i
[(i   1)+ 1]2 (2)
where i =
Pi(;H)
Pi(;L)
is independent of  when employers observe human capital perfectly.
Under the assumption that Pi(;H) > Pi(; L) (or equivalently, if (1) holds), i > 1, so
that the expression in (2) is strictly decreasing in . Thus, posterior beliefs are concave func-
tions of observed human capital. Under no information asymmetry, since e;0() > e;1(),
posterior beliefs about entrepreneurs in state 1 will be steeper than those for entrepreneurs
in state 0 if  is su¢ ciently close to one (see Figure 1).17 By contrast, when  is su¢ ciently
17More specically, a su¢ cient condition is   12 . This can be shown by examining the derivative of
0e;i() with respect to i, which is negative as long as i  1  ; this, in turn, holds for   12 since i  1:
To complete the argument, note that 1 < 0.
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small, the posterior associated with state 1 will be atter than the posterior associated with
state 0.
[Insert gure 1]
As before, we now turn to the case where the information available to employers is
limited to what is in the data. The slope of the posterior probability of a high human capital
conditional on entrepreneurship is then given by
0e;i() =
Pi(;H)Pi(; L)

1 + (1  )

@Pi
@
(;H)
Pi(;H)
 
@Pi
@
(;L)
Pi(;L)

[Pi(;H) + (1  )Pi(; L)]2 (3)
By the increasing hazard rate property, the term in the curly brackets in the numerator
@Pi
@
(;H)
Pi(;H)
 
@Pi
@
(; L)
Pi(; L)
has the sign of W 0i () and the term in the square brackets
1 + (1  )
(
@Pi
@
(;H)
Pi(;H)
 
@Pi
@
(; L)
Pi(; L)
)
is larger if W 0i is larger. If W
0
i = 0, the term in the curly brackets is zero, and therefore the
slope of posterior beliefs is given by (2). Since this is decreasing in , the posterior beliefs
are concave as in the perfect information case. However since e;1() is larger than e;0(),
e;1() will now have a steeper curve for  small while e;0() will have the steeper curve for
 large.
However the above analysis was carried out assuming W 0i = 0 for all i. In this setup
where information asymmetries are most extreme, we must have W 01 > 0 since there are no
depreciation motives for entrepreneurs in state 1, and therefore a higher observed human
capital translates into higher expected wages. We also know that W 01 > W
0
0 where W
0
0 may
be 0 or even negative when the depreciation motive is so high that it wipes out the positive
benets of higher observed human capital on expected wages.
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Assuming that W 01 is signicantly larger than W
0
0 and that W
0
0 may even be negative
allows for a situation where e;1 is steeper than e;0 for a large range of values of  and e;0
is decreasing in  on some interval. This is illustrated by Figures 2 and 3 (the functional
forms used to derive these gures are described in the Appendix). Figure 3 depicts the slopes
of the two curves and shows that e;1 is steeper than e;0 for  < 0:67. We also observe that
e;0 is decreasing on the interval [0:54; 0:64]. Within this interval, for entrepreneurs starting
from an unfavorable state, higher observed human capital implies lower actual human capital.
[Insert Figures 2 and 3]
We now discuss how the above theoretical analysis may be used to analyze the data
presented in section 2.
4 Empirical analysis
4.1 Empirical predictions on rm survival
Recall that in Section 2, we presented data on di¤erences in survival rates for entrepreneurs
with di¤erent education levels and di¤erent initial states. We now discuss how the theoretical
model of the previous section may be used to obtain predictions on and interpretations of the
impact of education and initial state on survival. Both education and initial state provide
information about the entrepreneurs human capital and should therefore a¤ect our prior,
: The link with education is obvious, a higher education level corresponding to a higher
. Regarding the initial state, the link is less direct and depends on the extent to which
potential employers have better information than the data. If the informational advantage is
signicant, then a bad initial state in the labor market should be interpreted as a bad signal
on the individuals human capital resulting in a lower value of .
Higher unobserved human capital is expected to positively a¤ect rm survival so that
a higher posterior, e;i(); should translate into a higher survival rate. Predictions of the
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theoretical model pertain to the relative position of the posterior belief curve for di¤erent
initial states (i.e., comparing posteriors for di¤erent initial states, holding  constant) but
also to the slope of these curves (i.e., measuring the impact of a change in  for a given
initial state).
First consider the survival rates across di¤erent initial states for a given education level.
Statistics presented in Section 2 indicate that entrepreneurs who were employed and did not
change their branch of activity (state 1) when they started a business survive better than
those who were unemployed or were employed in a di¤erent branch (state 0). If we derive
the prior  from education alone, then the curve e;1 should be above e;0. This is consistent
with the predictions of our model with strong information asymmetries for the employers
but not with a model where employers have perfect information. Nevertheless, in the latter
case, unemployment or a job with a bad match may indicate that employers are observing
some adverse information about the individual that is not available in the data. Then, for
a given education level, the prior on human capital should be updated downwards for those
entrepreneurs who started out in either of these two unfavorable states. The lower survival
rates can therefore be explained by an unfavorable prior on human capital for entrepreneurs
in these subgroups. It is therefore not possible to discriminate between the two models by
directly comparing survival rates across entrepreneurs with di¤erent initial states.
Second, regarding the impact of education on survival across di¤erent initial states, our
descriptive statistics indicate that it is very strong and positive for entrepreneurs who were
initially well matched whereas it is rather limited for those who were short term unemployed
or mismatched.18 In order to obtain such predictions in our theoretical model, the curve
describing posterior beliefs in state 1 (e;1) should be steeper than e;0. The model with
no information asymmetry only yields this result for high enough values of  (Figure 1).
18As pointed out in Section 2, the large impact for long term unemployed is not robust, as our econometric
analysis shows.
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Yet we pointed out above that the prior on human capital for a given level of education
should be lower for entrepreneurs with an unfavorable initial state. Because of concavity
of the posterior e;i, di¤erences in observed human capital for those entrepreneurs should
correspond to larger di¤erences in actual human capital thus resulting in large di¤erences in
survival rates (see Figure 1). Thus our data are not adequately explained by a model where
employers are close to perfectly informed about human capital.
If employers only observe a very imprecise signal about the individuals human capital, it
may be assumed that the prior  is solely determined by education. The simulations depicted
in Figures 2 and 3 show that if we assume a wide enough di¤erence between W
0
1 and W
0
0
then e;1 is steeper than e;0 for a wide range of values of . The result requires that  is not
too close to 1 which is reasonable if we think of unobserved human capital for entrepreneurs
as comprising some rare abilities that will increase the likelihood of success of the new
rm. In other words, observed human capital (the prior probability associated with high
human capital) is expected to be relatively low even for entrepreneurs with high education
levels. This di¤erence in slope is consistent with our descriptive statistics according to which
di¤erences in education levels have a strong impact for entrepreneurs who were initially
well matched and a limited impact for entrepreneurs in a less favorable initial state. In the
simulations W
0
0 is taken to be much smaller than W
0
1 and eventually becomes negative for 
large enough. This reects high depreciation for those who were initially in an unfavorable
state. Simulations in Figure 3 show that if the e¤ect of depreciation is very strong, rms
created by better educated individuals can even survive less.
4.2 Data
As in the descriptive statistics in section 2, we distinguish one favorable state corresponding
to individuals who were working in the same branch of activity, from 3 unfavorable initial
states: employed in a di¤erent branch, short term unemployed and long term unemployed.
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Our sample, which is the same as in section 2, comprises 36:67% who were employed with
experience in the same branch, 9:38% who were employed and switched branch, 36:80% who
were unemployed for less than one year and 17:16% who were unemployed for over one year.
Our measure of observed human capital is the entrepreneurs education level that is either
low, intermediate or high (dened in section 2). We do not use data on experience because it
only measures experience in the same branch of industry; it is however included as a control
variable and its impact is discussed in section 4.4.1.
In order to allow for di¤erences in the relationship between observed and unobserved
human capital according to the initial state of the entrepreneur, we use interactions between
education level and variables pertaining to the initial state (see Table 2). We also use several
other explanatory variables as controls; these chosen variables are commonly included in
survival analysis of new rms (see Table 3).
Our results highlight di¤erences in the impact of education on survival across sub-groups
of entrepreneurs who di¤er in their previous labor market state.
4.3 Econometric modeling
4.3.1 Cox proportional hazards model
We employ hazard regression models to study the impact of various explanatory factors
(covariates) on exits of French rms. The SINE 94/97 provides a discontinuation date for
all those rms that stopped business before December 1997, so that the duration of each
rms life is observed in months. If the rm was still alive at the end of the period, the
corresponding duration data are right censored. The covariates include various measures of
human capital, as well as controls for entrepreneur attributes, rm attributes and nancial
constraints. In addition, and in line with our theory, we consider a potentially important
role for unobserved human capital.
First, we estimate a Cox proportional hazards model (Cox, 1972), which has been the
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corner-stone of empirical analysis of duration data since the past 35 years. Initially, we do
not consider unobserved heterogeneity. Consider a sample of size n from the population
of newly created rms. The conditional probability of exit at time t, given the vector of
explanatory variables x, is measured by the hazard rate function h(tjx). For each rm i,
the data provides information on its life span ti measured in months,19 and its individual
characteristics (xi). Whether the rm was still active at the end of the study period is
captured by a binary variable (ai) describing censoring as follows.
ai =

0 : if the rm i is still active at the time of the second survey in 1997
1 : if the rm i ceased its activity between 1994 and 1997
:
Then, the continuous time Cox proportional hazards model is described by:
h(tjx; ) = h0(t): exp(x0); (4)
where h0(t) is an unspecied function of t called the baseline hazard function and  is a vector
of the regression coe¢ cients. Cox (1972, 1975) proposed a powerful estimation methodology
based on maximizing the partial likelihood function:
PL =
nY
i=1
2664 exp(x0i)nP
j=1
Yij exp(x0i)
3775
ai
;
where Yij = 1 if tj  ti and Yij = 0 if tj < ti. The Y s are a convenient method to
exclude from the denominator the individuals who have already experienced the exit event
and are thus not part of the risk set. The population included in the denominator has not
ceased its activity before ti. For censored individuals the exit time is not observed so that
no probability of exit may be included in the partial likelihood. Therefore, ai = 0 for such
individuals. The maximum partial likelihood estimators b are obtained by maximizing the
log of the above partial likelihood function with respect to .
19ti is the di¤erence between the date of cessation of activity and the date of setting up of the i-th rm.
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Since the exit times are grouped into months since entry, there are a substantial number of
ties. These ties are resolved using the popular methodology proposed by Breslow (1974). The
estimation exercise was carried out using the STATA software. In order to identify di¤erences
in the impact of observed human capital on survival across initial states of the entrepreneur,
we obtain separate model estimates for four sub-samples: (i) individuals employed in the
same branch of activity; (ii) individuals employed in di¤erent branches of activity; (iii)
individuals unemployed for less than one year; (iv) individuals employed for more than one
year.
These results are reported in Table 4; results in the rst column correspond to the full
sample, and sub-sample estimates are presented in columns 2-5. While the e¤ects of the
explanatory variables are consistent with a priori expectations, the proportional hazards
assumption is rejected, at the 1% level of signicance, by the Grambsch and Therneau
(1994) test, indicating the possibility of unobserved heterogeneity. Such heterogeneity is
consistent with our theoretical model that allows for some unobserved human capital which
is orthogonal to observed human capital. In other words, actual human capital is partly, but
not perfectly, correlated with observed human capital.
Next, we address the discrete (monthly) nature of our duration data by considering a
grouped time version of the Cox proportional hazards model, also called the complementary
log-log model or discrete PH model (Cox, 1972; Prentice and Gloeckler, 1978)
ln [  ln f1  hj (x; )g] = x0 + j; (5)
where the time intervals are indexed by j = 1; 2; : : : and hj denotes the discrete hazard
rate in interval j (assumed constant over the interval). This discrete proportional hazards
model assumes that latent continuous failure times have a proportional hazards specication
but are grouped into intervals. Unlike the standard implementation of this model assuming
a constant baseline hazard rate, we capture time variation in the baseline hazard function
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across periods by including the discrete time dummies j. In other words, like the continuous
time Cox proportional hazards model, we allow the baseline hazard function to change over
time. Our empirical specication allows the baseline hazard rate to vary over the four yearly
time periods in the sample.
Since estimation is quite demanding, we estimate the discrete duration model for the full
sample only and not for sub-samples based on initial state. However, we take into account
di¤erential impact of education on survival by interacting the education variable with the
initial state. This model was also estimated using the STATA software, and the rst column
of Table 5 reports the estimation results.
4.3.2 Unobserved heterogeneity
In our analysis, education should be viewed not so much as a variable having a direct impact
on survival but rather as providing partial information about actual human capital that
remains unobserved. We therefore expect some unobserved heterogeneity in our hazard
regression models, and the impact of education on survival will di¤er for each individual
depending on the realization of actual human capital.
In other words, our theoretical framework has two basic implications for appropriate
modeling of the impact of education on rmssurvival. First, the impact of education is
likely to be di¤erentiated according to the entrepreneurs initial state, and second, human
capital of the entrepreneur may be partly unobserved. While we addressed the rst issue
(in section 4.3.1) by estimating separate coe¢ cients for the impact of education across the
four subsamples with di¤erent prior employment status, the second issue, that of unobserved
heterogeneity, can produce inconsistent estimates of the e¤ect of the regressors () as well
as the baseline hazard function, h0(t).
Specically, we consider the grouped time proportional hazards model (5) and follow
Jenkins (1995) in characterizing the frailty distribution by discrete mixtures of degenerate
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distributions in a sequence with increasing number (r = 2; 3; : : :) of components:
ln [  ln f1  hj (xi; ; ui)g] = x0i + j + ln (ui) ; i = 1; : : : ; n;
ln (ui) 2 fm1 = 0;m2; : : : ;mrg =
8>>><>>>:
m1 with prob. 1
m2 with prob. 2
...
mr with prob. r
; r = 2; 3; : : : (6)
A sequential estimation procedure is adopted, starting with r = 2 and increasing the number
of components, r, progressively. The procedure is terminated when subsequent steps lead
to degeneracy or no improvement in the maximized likelihood value. This methodology
for approximating any arbitrary frailty distribution, rst proposed in Heckman and Singer
(1984), is very useful in that it approximates the nonparametric frailty distribution by an
increasing sequence of parametric distributions. Further, in allowing an arbitrary frailty
distribution, the method is robust to violations of the frailty distribution assumptions which
can be quite critical in practise; see, for example, Baker and Melino (2000). Maximum
likelihood estimates of the covariate e¤ects and the frailty distribution, based on the full
sample data, are reported in the last column of Table 5.
4.4 Results
The estimates for the continuous time Cox model are summarized in Table 4 and those for
the grouped data model in Table 5. In both these sets of results, a positive  means that
the group under consideration exits more than the reference group, and vice versa. Table
5 also includes estimates of the grouped data proportional hazards model with unobserved
heterogeneity. The data support a two support point frailty distribution. Table 6 reports
tests of di¤erences in the e¤ect of education across various initial states.
Below, we rst discuss e¤ects of the included regressors observed human capital, fol-
lowed by nancing constraints, entrepreneur and rm characteristics, and nally unobserved
heterogeneity.
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4.4.1 Observed human capital
Results on the impact of education are consistent with the descriptive statistics of Section
2. Higher education reduces signicantly the hazard rate for individuals employed in the
same sector or unemployed for more than one year. It has no signicant impact or may even
increase the hazard rate for individuals employed in a di¤erent branch or unemployed for
less than one year.20
Note that these results on the impact of education are particularly robust and signicant
in all the specications of our econometric model (Tables 4, 5 and 6), with the exception of
the negative impact of a high education level relative to an intermediate education level for
mismatched individuals that is signicant only for the continuous time proportional hazard
model. In particular, education level has no signicant impact on survival for mismatched
and short term unemployed individuals in the grouped data model whether or not unobserved
heterogeneity is accounted for. Hence, this lack of signicance may not be attributed to a
bias caused by unobserved heterogeneity that is orthogonal to the covariates. Our theoretical
analysis suggests that this evidence can be attributed to some unobserved human capital
that is correlated with education.
The signicance of education for the long term unemployed individuals is an interesting
nding. In the context of our model, this reects lack of concern for depreciation among
those who are highly educated, and suggests that their human capital may already have
depreciated. It is well documented that unemployment duration exhibits negative duration
dependence, in the sense that a longer unemployment spell decreases the rate of exit from
unemployment (see Fougères, 2000, for a survey of studies on the French labor market). In
any case, the positive impact of education on survival for the long term unemployed is much
20In the continuous proportional hazard specication, for individuals employed in a di¤erent branch, those
with a high education level actually have a signicantly higher hazard rate than those with an intermediate
education level who are the reference group.
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less signicant than for those who were employed in the same branch (as can be seen for
instance by comparing Tables 6a and 6d).
The theory also suggests that the impact of experience may di¤er depending on the entre-
preneurs initial labor market state. The data only provides information about experience
in the new rms branch of activity. As in previous studies, (e.g. Bates, 2005), we nd
that more sector specic experience signicantly improves survival. According to the results
from the continuous time Cox model and contrary to results on education, this is the case
independent of the employment status.
Experience acquired in a small rm where better entrepreneurial skills can be attained
(because of a broader variety of tasks) also enhances the survival chances. Recent empirical
literature (see, for example, Wagner, 2003, 2006, Baumol, 2004) links the acquisition of a
wide variety of skills with the choice of becoming an entrepreneur; see also Lazear (2004,
2005) for a theory of entrepreneurship along the same lines. Our results may be interpreted
as showing a link between the scope of acquired skills and success in entrepreneurship.
Our ndings on the impact of previous entrepreneurial experience on survival are that
such experience enhances the rms viability which is in line with Taylor (1999) (see Cressy
(1996) for some contrasting predictions).
4.4.2 Financial constraints
As discussed earlier, our model predicts that nancial constraints may result in a shift to
the left of the distribution of .21 This is formally similar to a change upwards in W in the
sense that it reduces the probability of becoming an entrepreneur. Thus we may apply the
comparative statics analysis on W to infer whether nancially constrained individuals are
more or less likely to have a high level of unobserved human capital.22
21This implies a higher value of F at all points (meaning that the resulting distribution is stochastically
dominated in the rst order by the initial one).
22Hurst and Lusardi (2004) challenge the view that entrepreneurial choice is signicantly a¤ected by
nancial constraints. However, Fairlie and Krashinsky (2006), by controlling for the employment status of
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Our empirical analysis of the impact of observed human capital on survival suggests that
the proper specication of the theoretical model is that with strong information asymmetry
so that proposition 2 applies. In other words, unobserved human capital is expected to be
higher for those individuals who were initially in a favorable labor market state (state 1).
The corresponding result for nancing constraints is that individuals who are nancially
constrained are more likely to have a high level of unobserved human capital and hence
should be expected to be more successful as entrepreneurs.
In our data, we have information about whether entrepreneurs have applied for a bank
loan to start the project and if yes, whether they were granted the loan or not. It should be
expected that those who started a business despite not getting a loan or those who did not
even apply for such a loan are on average less nancially constrained than those who started
the project with the help of a bank loan. Our results on survival show that rms set up by
entrepreneurs who successfully applied for a loan survive longer. These results may reect
the superiority of debt contracts over labor contracts in eliciting private information.
4.4.3 Entrepreneur and project attributes
We include several entrepreneur and rm level characteristics as control variables. By and
large, our results conrm those of many other studies for such variables as age (Cressey and
Storey, 1995) and sector (Taylor, 1999). Regarding the entrepreneurs motivations, we nd
that novel ideareduces signicantly the probability of exit after controlling for unobserved
heterogeneity. By contrast, if the main motivation is imitation of a relative or a friend
(entourage example) then exit is as likely as for entrepreneurs who are motivated by evading
unemployment which is the reference class. Hence the positive impact of an entrepreneurial
milieu, which we nd, cannot be attributed to a role model e¤ect but rather to some social
networking or work experience acquired in the family business as emphasized by Fairlie
the individual prior to entrepreneurship and using the same instrumentation strategy as Hurst and Lusardi
(2004), nds a signicant role for nancial constraints.
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and Robb (2006). Another result on motivation is that, individuals who have a taste for
entrepreneurship or benet from an entrepreneurial opportunity set up rms with higher
chances of survival.
Some rm characteristics also provide important insights into exit. We nd that rms
protected by limited liability survive better than those under unlimited liability. This is in
contradiction with results reported in Harho¤ et al. (1998). This may be because we do
not distinguish between di¤erent competing risks: their results only pertain to involuntary
liquidations so that the higher exit rate we nd for rms with unlimited liability may be
explained by voluntary discontinuations without losses for creditors (see also Bates, 2005).
Previous literature reports ambiguous results for both the impact of the initial size of the
rm (in terms of initial labor force) and the impact of previous entrepreneurial experience.
We nd that a large initial size is detrimental to survival which is coherent with results in
Das and Srinivasan (1997).23 Finally, we nd evidence that rms are more likely to survive if
they are created in regions with a low entrepreneurial intensity, if the number of their initial
customers were large or if the entrepreneur was previously in a managerial or executive
position.
4.4.4 Unobserved heterogeneity
The results provide evidence of individual level frailty orthogonal to observed levels of human
capital (Table 5). In order to model these e¤ects, we estimate grouped data proportional
hazards models with discrete mixture frailty distributions. The results show a signicant
impact of unobserved heterogeneity, and favor an estimated two support points frailty dis-
tribution. These two support points can be interpreted as representing high and low levels
of unobserved human capital.24
23However, other studies nd a reverse relation between initial size and survival (Mata and Portugal, 1994,
Audrestch and Mahmood, 1995).
24We estimated similar models for di¤erent sub-samples of the data; the results are in broad conformity,
but it is somewhat di¢ cult to draw strong conclusions because of lower sample sizes.
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The two point discrete mixture frailty distribution also o¤ers an interesting perspective in
relation to our theoretical analysis of unobserved human capital. Under this characterization,
unobserved human capital can be thought of as being high for some entrepreneurs and low for
others. The estimates suggest that 81 per cent of entrepreneurs draw the low value (resulting
in a positive unobserved heterogeneity level of m2), while the remaining 19 per cent draw a
high level of unobserved human capital (resulting in a zero unobserved heterogeneity level).
In other words, entrepreneurs drawing the low value can be those whose human capital is
approximately valued appropriately in the labor market, while the high value entrepreneurs
face a signicantly lower valuation.
5 Concluding remarks
We nd strong empirical evidence that, for the sample of new French rms considered in this
paper, the positive impact of an entrepreneurs education on the new rms survival varies
signicantly depending on the entrepreneurs initial state in the labor market. Specically,
the relationship is signicant only for individuals who were employed and started a business
in a sector in which they had some prior experience. Based on our model, we argue that the
observed di¤erential impact of education may be attributed to a sample selection bias such
that the unobserved human capital is negatively correlated with education for entrepreneurs
whose previous labor market status was unfavorable. This suggests that if the impact of
education on survival is measured without conditioning on prior labor market status, then
it will be underestimated.
Our theoretical analysis of the sample selection bias stresses the role of entrepreneurship
as a response to labor market ine¢ ciencies. Empirical results are best explained by a model
where the information available to employers about potential entrepreneurs is not signi-
cantly better than that available in the data: this is what makes it costly for individuals
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with a high level of observed human capital to be in an unfavorable state so that they choose
entrepreneurship irrespective of their actual level of human capital.
The link between labor market rigidities and self-employment has already been discussed
in the literature that focuses on the macroeconomic interactions between entrepreneurship
and unemployment. For instance, Thurik et al. (2007) nd that the entrepreneurial e¤ect
whereby more entrepreneurship today reduces unemployment tomorrow is much stronger
than the refugeee¤ect corresponding to a higher entrepreneurial activity during periods
with high unemployment.
Our analysis has mixed implications as to the plausibility of such a refugee e¤ect. Al-
though self-employment is a means of moving out of unemployment, a high unemployment
rate may deter individuals from starting a business anticipating that, in case of failure, a
salaried job may not be readily available: this may be particularly the case for individuals
beneting from a favorable labor market state who, as a result, give up entrepreneurship
despite a high level of unobserved ability. This suggests that on a cross section of di¤erent
countries, it is unclear whether those with high unemployment should have higher or lower
self employment rates. It should be expected however that the systematic di¤erences in the
impact of education on survival, across entrepreneurs with di¤erent initial states, should be
less salient in countries where the labor market is more uid than that of France.
This relationship between labor market rigidities and entrepreneurship also points to
some possible policy recommendations. Obviously, reducing labor market rigidities may
encourage entrepreneurship of the right type corresponding to some ability that is not
properly exploited by the labor market. Short of reducing rigidities, nancial aids aimed
at entrepreneurs might be better applied if targeted at individuals returning to the labor
market after a period of self employment.
Our data on survival of new rms does not allow us to discriminate between terminations
that are true failures involving bankruptcies and situations where the entrepreneur chooses
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to sell a healthy business and quit, which occurs quite frequently as documented by various
studies; see, for example, Bates (2005) and Bhattacharjee et al. (2008a). Note however that
such successfulshut downs of rms often correspond to a move from self employment to
a salaried position, suggesting that the latter situation is more attractive. This is consistent
with our theoretical analysis where individuals choose self-employment whenever it is more
rewarding than the labor market. Therefore, these entrepreneurs return to the labor market
when their business yields insu¢ cient prot as compared to what they could obtain in a
salaried position. Still there might be some additional insights from looking at other measures
of the rms performance, which we intend to do in our future research. For instance, using
more detailed nancial information will enable us to better account for the role of nancial
factors in rm exit.25
We have argued that better educated individuals are more eager to move away from a
bad labor market state and hence choose self employment independent of their actual human
capital, in particular because they might worry about the depreciation of their observed
human capital. This explanation in terms of di¤erential benets from starting a new business
between educated and uneducated persons may however be only part of the story. It is likely
that there is a di¤erence in cost, to the extent that education provides the type of general
human capital that is quite useful in overcoming the di¢ culties in starting and managing
a new rm. Future research should explore the nature of human capital needed to start
a business in di¤erent sectors and the implications for entrepreneurs with di¤erent initial
states in the labor market.
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Appendix
Assume that L = 0 and H = 5
In the case without information asymetry, for a logistic distribution of  and for a given
Wi, the posterior probability that the human is high conditional on entrepreneurship and on
unobserved human capital  simplies to :e;i() =
[e5+e5 W (0)]
e5 W (0)+(e5 eW (1) W (0))+eW (1) W (0)
Assume that in the favourable initial state, W1() = (+ 1)
2   1, so that W1(1) = 3
and W1(0) = 0 the posterior beliefs in the good state are e;1() =
2e2
e2+(e2 1)+1
In the bad state , if  < 1=2 then W0() =    2; W0(0) = 0 and for  > 1=2;
W0() = 100  1002   24:75 so W0(1) =  24:75
The posterior belief is
e;0() =
2e5
e5+(e5 e 24;75)+e 24;75 :
The red curve represents the function e;0() and the doted curve refers to e;1():
In the case with information asymetry, e;i() =
[e5+e Wi()+5]
e Wi()+5+(e5 1)+1
In the favourable initial state where W1() = (+ 1)
2   1, e;1() = (e
5+e (+1)
2+6)
e (+1)2+6+(e5 1)+1
In the unfavourable initial state, for  < 1=2; W0() =   2 and for  > 1=2; W0() =
100  1002   24:75 then :
e;0() =
8<:
(e5+e100
2 100+29:75)
e100
2 100+29:75+(e5 1)+1 if   1=2
(e5+e
2 +5)
e
2 +5+(e5 1)+1 if  < 1=2
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TABLE 1: Discrepancies in survival raters for di¤erent education levels according
to the situation at the time of creation
Education Levels
Low High
Overall Population : 58:97%26
(589127)
50:38%
(541)
63:36%
(1258)
Employed : 63:50%
(2593)
54:66%
(223)
68:37%
(541)
Employed, Same branch : 67:63%
(2072)
58:05%
(156)
72:44%
(620)
Employed, Di¤. branch : 48:33%
(521)
46:34%
(67)
50:60%
(140)
Unemployed : 54:87%
(3298)
46:68%
(318)
55:61%
(498)
Short term unemployed : 57:45%
(2276)
51:23%
(214)
56:28%
(342)
Long term unemployed : 49:54%
(1022)
38:16%
(104)
54:09%
(156)
26Weighted survival rate after 4 years
27Unweighted sample size (still running and closed down rms)
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TABLE 2: Human Capital Variables
VARIABLES MODALITIES
Education (educational level)
- High (diploma received
after two years and more at University)
- Intermediate28 (Professional
diploma and Secondary School diploma)
- Low (no diploma)
Employment, previous status
(occupationbefore the setting-up
of the new rm)
- Employed, same branch (salaried in the
same branch of activity)
- Di¤erent branch (salaried in a di¤erent
branch of activity)
- Short term unemployed ( less than one year)
- Long term unemployed ( more than one year)
Duration of experience in the same
branch of activity
- Less than 3 years
- 3 / 10 years
- More than 10 years
Size of the enterprise where this
experience has been acquired
- Less than 10 employees
- 10 / 100 employees
- More than 100 employees
Employment & Education (Educational
level& Occupation before the
setting-up of the new rm)
- Same branch, High education
- Same branch, Intermediate education
- Same branch, Low education
- Di¤erent branch, High education
- Di¤erent branch, Intermediate education
- Di¤erent branch, Low education
- Short term unemployed, High education
- Short term unemployed, Intermediate education
- Short term unemployed, Low education
- Long term unemployed, High education
- Long term unemployed, Intermediate education
- Long term unemployed, Low education
Previous setting-up of new rms
- Never
- Once or more
28 refers to the reference class in the estimates
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TABLE 3: Control Variables
VARIABLES MODALITIES
ENTREPRENEUR ATRIBUTES
Age of entrepreneur
- 25/35 years
- 35/40 years
- 40/50 years
Entrepreneurship "milieu"
- Yes (relatives and close relationship
- No
Main motivation (when the
entrepreneur sets-ups its rm)
- New idea
- Opportunity / taste for entrepreneurship
- Unemployed
- Entourage example
FIRM ATTRIBUTES
Initial size of entreprise
- Zero or one employee
- More than one employee
Initial demand (number of customers)
- 1/10 customers
- More than 10 customers
Legal status
- Limited liability
- Unlimited liability
Region of incorporation
- Low entrepreneurship
- High entrepreneurship
Industry
- Catering / Trade
- Manufacturing
- Construction, Transports
- Services
FINANCIAL CONSTRAINTS
Initial capital invested
- Less than 15245 euros
- 15245 / 76224 euros
- More than 76224 euros
Public nancial aid, 1994
- Obtained aid
- None obtained
Bank loans, 1994
- Applied and refused
- Applied and received
- Not applied
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TABLE 4: Estimates for Continuous Time Cox Model29 ;30
Variables Full Sub-sample, by prev. employment
sample Di¤erent Long term Short term Same
branch unemployed unemployed branch
Human Capital
Education
(Base = Intermediate) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
High  0:150
( 4:6)
0:273
(3:1)
 0:289
( 3:5)
0:025
(0:4)
 0:427
( 7:0)
Low 0:124
(3:2)
0:163
(1:2)
0:136
(1:6)
 0:014
( 0:2)
0:239
(3:3)
Employment, previous status
(Base = Di¤erent branch) 0:00        
Long term unemployed 0:145
(3:0)
       
Short term unemployed 0:092
(2:0)
       
Employed, same branch  0:331
( 7:4)
       
Experience, same branch
(Base = 3  10 years) 0:00   0:00 0:00 0:00
Less than 3 years 0:173
(4:8)
  0:107
(1:4)
0:240
(4:2)
0:183
(2:9)
More than 10 years  0:276
( 9:3)
   0:322
(4:9)
 0:251
( 5:2)
 0:289
( 5:5)
Size, prev. same branch rm
(Base = 10  100 employees) 0:00   0:00 0:00 0:00
Less than 10 employees  0:351
( 12:6)
   0:376
( 5:9)
 0:436
( 10:0)
 0:226
( 45)
More than 100 employees 0:074
(2:0)
  0:200
(2:0)
 0:032
( 0:5)
0:222
(3:6)
Previous professional status
(Base = Worker) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Manager/ Executive  0:075
( 2:3)
 0:520
( 5:3)
0:128+
(1:7)
 0:122
( 2:2)
0:087
(1:4)
Craftsman/ Middle mgmt. 0:004
(0:1)
0:378
( 3:0)
0:129
(1:4)
 0:092
( 1:5)
0:219
(3:6)
Student 0:176
(2:9)
 0:791
( 2:1)
0:268
(3:0)
0:375
(3:3)
0:117
(0:9)
Previous setting up of new rms
(Base = Once or more) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Never 0:230
(7:3)
0:336
(3:7)
0:120+
(1:6)
0:283
(5:0)
0:182
(3:3)
29z-ratios are reported in parentheses.
30 ,  and + : Signicant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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TABLE 4: Estimates for Continuous Time Cox Model (contd.)
Variables Full Sub-sample, by prev. employment
sample Di¤erent Long term Short term Same
branch unemployed unemployed branch
Entrepreneur Attributes
Age of entrepreneur
(Base = 35  40 years) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
25  35 years 0:007
(0:2)
 0:196
( 2:1)
0:103
(1:2)
0:072
(1:4)
 0:006
( 0:1)
40  50 years  0:097
( 2:9)
 0:420
( 4:1)
0:080
(1:0)
 0:129
( 2:3)
0:073
(1:2)
Entrepreneurship "milieu"
(Base = Yes) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
No (relatives/close reltns.) 0:103
(4:1)
0:188
(2:6)
0:258
(4:6)
0:056
(1:4)
0:005
(0:1)
Main motivation
(Base = Unemployed) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
New idea  0:085+
( 1:7)
 0:087
( 0:4)
0:303
(3:1)
 0:311
( 3:4)
 0:226
( 2:0)
Opportunity/ Taste for
entrepreneurship  0:179
( 5:2)
 0:198
( 1:1)
 0:152
( 2:5)
 0:214
( 4:2)
 0:174+
( 1:9)
Entourage example 0:134
(2:3)
 0:083
( 0:4)
0:087
(0:7)
0:203
(2:1)
0:185
(1:4)
Firm Attributes
Initial size of enterprise
(Base = Max. 1 employee) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
More than one employee 0:176
(6:9)
 0:031
( 0:4)
0:292
(4:8)
0:288
(6:7)
0:059
(1:2)
Initial demand
(Base = > 10 customers) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Between 1  10 customers 0:120
(4:6)
0:350
(4:0)
0:131
(2:2)
0:003
(0:1)
0:139
(3:0)
Legal status
(Base = Unlimited liability) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Limited liability  0:393
( 13:4)
 0:560
( 6:2)
 0:334
( 4:5)
 0:517
( 10:4)
 0:300
( 5:8)
Region of incorporation
(Base = High entrepreneurship) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Low entrepreneurship  0:082
( 3:4)
 0:112
( 1:5)
0:016
(0:3)
 0:239
( 6:1)
 0:014
( 0:3)
Industry
(Base = Services) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Catering/ Trade 0:328
(10:5)
0:158+
(1:9)
0:356
(5:1)
0:338
(6:4)
0:254
(4:2)
Manufacturing  0:058
( 1:3)
 0:108
( 0:7)
 0:094
( 1:0)
 0:105
( 1:5)
 0:006
( 0:1)
Construction/ Transport  0:262
( 7:5)
 0:534
( 4:1)
 0:230
( 3:1)
 0:323
( 5:8)
 0:246
( 3:5)
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TABLE 4: Estimates for Continuous Time Cox Model (contd.)
Variables Full Sub-sample, by prev. employment
sample Di¤erent Long term Short term Same
branch unemployed unemployed branch
Financing Constraints
Initial capital invested
(Base = 15245  76224 Euros) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
less than 15245 Euros 0:356
(11:2)
0:442
(4:5)
0:463
(5:3)
0:477
(9:0)
0:156
(3:0)
more than 76224 Euros  0:521
( 7:1)
 1:157
( 4:7)
 0:321+
( 1:7)
 0:278
( 2:0)
 0:513
( 4:6)
Public nancial aid, 1994
(Base = None) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Obtained aid  0:347
( 11:7)
 0:515
( 2:6)
 0:222
( 4:0)
 0:410
( 9:8)
 0:357
( 4:2)
Bank loans, 1994
(Base = Not applied) 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
Applied and refused 0:048
(1:0)
0:512
(2:9)
 0:221
( 2:0)
0:189
(2:5)
0:090
(0:8)
Applied and received  0:290
( 9:7)
 0:030
( 0:3)
 0:010
( 0:2)
 0:202
( 4:4)
 0:679
( 11:1)
No. of rms 19; 213 1; 802 3; 296 7; 070 7; 045
No. of exits 7; 882 931 1; 663 3; 008 2; 280
Total time at risk (months) 730; 289 61; 055 115; 896 265; 585 287; 753
Log-likelihood  74629:8  6515:1  12771:2  25403:4  19445:8
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TABLE 5: Estimates for Grouped Time PH Model 31 ;32 ;33 ;34
Variables No frailty Discrete
mix. frailty
Log Baseline Hazard
Year 1  4:993
( 52:2)
 17:227
( 0:6)
[Year 2   Year 1] 0:283
(7:0)
0:353
(8:2)
[Year 3   Year 1] 0:506
(12:6)
0:646
(12:9)
[Year 4   Year 1] 0:351
(7:7)
0:595
(8:5)
Employment x Education
(Base) Same branch, High education 0:00 0:00
Intermediate education 0:315
(4:9)
0:315
(4:5)
Low education 0:616
(5:8)
0:602
(5:2)
Di¤erent branch, High education 0:622
(6:4)
0:664
(5:9)
Intermediate education 0:523
(6:4)
0:539
(5:8)
Low education 0:626
(4:5)
0:821
(4:2)
Short term unemployed, High education 0:625
(8:1)
0:684
(8:0)
Intermediate education 0:661
(10:0)
0:710
(9:6)
Low education 0:692
(7:1)
0:767
(6:8)
Long term unemployed, High education 0:538
(5:6)
0:614
(5:5)
Intermediate education 0:749
(10:4)
0:839
(10:3)
Low education 0:892
(7:9)
0:939
(7:2)
Human Capital
Experience, same branch
(Base = 3  10 years) 0:00 0:00
Less than 3 years 0:180
(3:8)
0:167
(3:1)
More than 10 years  0:290
( 7:4)
 0:331
( 7:5)
Size, prev. same branch rm
(Base = 10  100 employees) 0:00 0:00
Less than 10 employees  0:361
( 9:7)
 0:414
( 9:9)
More than 100 employees 0:077
(1:6)
0:085
(1:5)
31z-ratios are reported in parentheses.
32 ,  and + : Signicant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
33The results reported for the model with frailty are the best in terms of maxmised likelihood. These
correspond to a two-point discrete mixture frailty distribution.
34LR test rejects the null hypothesis of "no frailty" at 1% level of signicance.
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TABLE 5: Estimates for Grouped Time PH Model (contd.)
Variables No frailty Discrete
mix. frailty
Human Capital
Previous professional status
(Base = Worker) 0:00 0:00
Manager/ Executive  0:086
( 2:0)
 0:103
( 2:1)
Craftsman/ Middle mgmt.  0:014
( 0:3)
 0:018
( 0:4)
Student 0:156
(2:1)
0:271
(3:0)
Previous setting up of new rms
(Base = Once or more) 0:00 0:00
Never 0:234
(5:7)
0:256
(5:6)
Entrepreneur Attributes
Age of entrepreneur
(Base = 35  40 years) 0:00 0:00
25  35 years 0:021
(0:5)
 0:006
( 0:1)
40  50 years  0:072+
( 1:7)
 0:100
( 2:0)
Entrepreneurship "milieu"
(Base = Yes) 0:00 0:00
No (relatives/close reltns.) 0:100
(3:1)
0:130
(3:4)
Entrepreneur Attributes
Main motivation
(Base = Unemployed) 0:00 0:00
New idea  0:084
( 1:3)
 0:147
( 2:0)
Opportunity/ Taste for
entrepreneurship  0:168
( 3:8)
 0:215
( 4:2)
Entourage example 0:125
(1:5)
0:066
(0:7)
Firm Attributes
Initial size of enterprise
(Base = Max. 1 employee) 0:00 0:00
More than one employee 0:157
(4:5)
0:114
(2:8)
Number of customers
(Base = > 10 customers) 0:00 0:00
Between 1  10 customers 0:133
(4:0)
0:137
(3:6)
Legal status
(Base = Unlimited liability) 0:00 0:00
Limited liability  0:392
( 10:0)
 0:361
( 8:1)
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TABLE 5: Estimates for Grouped Time PH Model (contd.)
Variables No frailty Discrete
mix. frailty
Firm Attributes
Region of incorporation
(Base = High entrepreneurship) 0:00 0:00
Low entrepreneurship  0:068
( 2:2)
 0:049
( 1:4)
Industry
(Base = Services) 0:00 0:00
Catering/ Trade 0:322
(8:0)
0:392
(8:2)
Manufacturing  0:075
( 1:4)
 0:042
( 0:7)
Construction/ Transport  0:272
( 5:9)
 0:283
( 5:6)
Financing Constraints
Initial capital invested
(Base = 15245  76224 Euros) 0:00 0:00
less than 15245 Euros 0:343
(8:3)
0:384
(8:3)
more than 76224 Euros  0:502
( 5:2)
 0:522
( 5:2)
Public nancial aid, 1994
(Base = None) 0:00 0:00
Obtained aid  0:346
( 9:1)
 0:411
( 9:2)
Bank loans, 1994
(Base = Not applied) 0:00 0:00
Applied and refused 0:098
(1:6)
0:171
(2:3)
Applied and received  0:299
( 7:6)
 0:354
( 8:0)
Mixture Frailty Distbn.
m1  0   0:00
m2   12:44
(0:5)
1   0:186
(6:3)
2 = 1  1   0:814
(27:5)
No. of rms 19; 213 19; 213
No. of exits 7; 882 7; 882
Log-likelihood  24593:0  24583:7
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TABLE 6: Tests of di¤erences between coe¢ cients for the impact of Education35 ;36
6a- Employed, same branch
Low Intermediate High
Low 0,007 0,000
Intermediate 0,002 0,000
High 0,000 0,000
6b- Employed, di¤erent branch
Low Intermediate High
Low 0,149 0,443
Intermediate 0,45 0,278
High 0,976 0,314
6c- Short term unemployed
Low Intermediate High
Low 0,55 0,460
Intermediate 0,700 0,723
High 0,485 0,574
6d- Long term unemployed
Low Intermediate High
Low 0,415 0,027
Intermediate 0,168 0,030
High 0,005 0,017
35Tables report p values for the di¤erence between coe¢ cients tests. Values below the diagonal correspond
to the no frailty model and values above the diagonal correspond to the frailty model.
36 ,  and + : Signicant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively.
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Fig. 1: Posterior beliefs on human capital without information asymetry
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Fig. 2 : Posterior beliefs on human capital with information asymetry
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Fig. 3 : Comparisons of the slopes of e;0 and e;1
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